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I. INTRODUCTION
California has long established itself as a leader in climate change
policy, with a deeply entrenched and ever-developing regulatory framework.1
The state is home to some of the earliest research on, and regulations targeted
at, mitigating the severe implications of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,

1. See S.B. 455 (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), Stats. 1994, ch. 1179 (Cal.
1994). California’s South Coast Air Quality Management District [SCAQMD] program
to reduce emissions of nitrous oxide and sulfur oxide), recently updated at EPA Approval
of California Air Plan Revisions, SCAQMD portion of California’s State Implementation
Plan (SIP), 40 C.F.R. § 52 (effective Oct. 16, 2017); Assemb. B. 1493, 2001-2002 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2002) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5) (Deering 2018)
(“Pavley Legislation” or “Pavley I and Pavley II,” requiring the California Air Resources
Board [CARB] to adopt regulations designed to reduce GHG emissions from passenger
vehicles, light-duty trucks, and noncommercial vehicles sold in California after the statute
went into effect and creating statewide GHG reduction targets (2009-2025) for new
passenger vehicles and trucks); Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (issued 2005 by Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger that called for statewide GHG emissions reductions to 1990 levels by
2020 and 80 percent reduction from 1990 levels by 2050), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.
php?id=1861 [https://perma.cc/H6D3-BWBL]; Assem. B. 32 (California Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006), 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 38500–38599 (Deering 2018) (calling for statewide GHG emissions reductions to 1990
levels by 2020) (discussed in detail in Section II below); Exec. Order No. S-01-07 (Jan.
18, 2007) (issued 2007 by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger directing CARB to reduce
carbon density of California’s transportation fuels by at least 10 percent by 2020 and ultimately
adopting the Low Carbon Fuel Standard for fuel providers), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.
php?id=5172 [https://perma.cc/MJ87-2V2R]; Exec. Order No. B-16-2012 (Mar. 23, 2012)
(issued by Governor Edmund Brown Jr. directing state entities to facilitate a statewide
transition to zero-emission vehicles and setting benchmarks [2015, 2020, 2025] for
infrastructure development and an 80 percent GHG emissions reduction goal from 1990
levels for the transportation sector by 2050), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17472
[https://perma.cc/9M4W-5PQ4]. See also S.B. 197, ch. 250 Stats. of 2016 (Cal. 2016)
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB197
[https://perma.cc/4TAZ-QDKJ]; S.B. 350, ch. 547, Stats. of 2015 (Cal. 2015) https://
leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB350 [https://
perma.cc/N4SM-7QFL]; Assemb. B. 398, ch. 135, Stats. of 2017 (Cal. 2017), https://leginfo.
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB398 [https://perma.cc/
CV9Z-W3TC]; Assemb. B. 617, ch. 136, Stats. of 2017 (Cal. 2017), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB617 [https://perma.cc/6Y8N-Z5NF].
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like carbon dioxide (CO2), on Earth’s atmosphere.2 It is therefore unsurprising
that California’s regulatory approaches for climate change mitigation and
GHG emissions reductions influence local and national climate change law
and policies.3 This influence also notably percolates international climate
policy.4 However, before California may definitively proclaim itself as a

2. See FRED PEARCE, WITH SPEED AND VIOLENCE: WHY SCIENTISTS FEAR TIPPING
POINTS IN CLIMATE CHANGE 10–13 (2007) (explaining Charles Keeling’s 1950’s monitoring of
atmospheric levels of CO2 at Scripps Institution of Oceanography in La Jolla, California).
Keeling’s most notable discovery—now known as the Keeling Curve—was the gradual
increase of superimposed CO2 emissions each year. Id. Before his death in 2005, Keeling
voiced concerns about earth’s weakening natural ability to absorb these emissions (known
today as “carbon sinks”), and ultimately evidenced the ability of humans to “tamper with
the planetary thermostat.” Id. at 12. See also RECLAIM, supra note 1 (establishing in the
1990’s an emissions trading program for facilities emitting nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur
oxides (SOx) in the South Coast Air Basin).
3. CAL. AIR RES. BD., THE 2017 CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN UPDATE: THE
PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING CALIFORNIA’S 2030 GREENHOUSE GAS TARGET 130–36
(2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/2030sp_pp_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ9XH7T6] [hereinafter SCOPING PLAN UPDATE] (providing directives and agendas for California’s
state and local climate policies). See also Notice of Decision Granting Waiver of Clean
Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32744–84 (July 8, 2009), https://
www.uschamber.com/sueandsettle/pleadings/California%20v.%20EPA/Grantingwaiver.pdf;
42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7543(b) (motor vehicles), 7543(e) (nonroad sources) (LEXIS through PL 115–
253) (granting and California’s Waiver under the Federal Clean Air Act). Most recently,
California passed S.B. 100 (De León) to generate 100% of the state’s energy from renewable
sources by the end of 2045. S.B. 100, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (approved by Governor
Sept. 10, 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180
SB100 [https://perma.cc/ESK4-9FB9].
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(c) (Deering 2018) (“California has long
been a national and international leader on energy conservation and environmental stewardship
efforts, including the areas of air quality protections, energy efficiency requirements, renewable
energy standards, natural resource conservation, and greenhouse gas emission standards
for passenger vehicles.”); ENVTL. DEF. FUND, California Leads Fight to Curb Climate
Change, https://www.edf.org/climate/california-leads-fight-curb-climate-change [https://perma.cc/
QUF8-6J9L]; John Monterubio, Recognition of Property Rights in Carbon Credits Under
California’s New Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y no.2, Winter 2012, at 32 (calling California “a pioneer of cap-and-trade”); ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, EPA’s Evaluation of the RECLAIM Program in the South Coast Air Quality
Management District, https://www3.epa.gov/region9/air/reclaim/ [https://perma.cc/4MLJ-6TPV]
(“RECLAIM has the longest history and practical experience of any locally designed and
implemented air emissions cap and trade [CAT] program.”); Alan Ramo, The California
Offset Game: Who Wins and Who Loses?, 20 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, no.
1, Winter 2014, at 109, 110, 145–46 [hereinafter Ramo] (explaining linkage between California’s
offset program and those in other states and countries). E.g., SCOPING PLAN UPDATE, supra
note 3.
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global model for successful climate change efforts,5 it must first refine
existing programs to ensure responsible regulatory authorities6 enforce
statutory parameters on emissions.7
A series of recent cases illustrates the lack of demonstrable reductions
in GHG emissions from regulated sources under California’s climate change
legislation. These matters challenged different, but interrelated, aspects of
CARB’s cap-and-trade policies to reduce GHGs under the California Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006, also known as Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32).8
Among the myriad of justifications necessitating a workable regulatory
framework to reduce emissions, two are most crucial. First, because
California’s climate policy is at least perceived a global exemplar, it is
necessary to ensure the programs, compliance methodologies, and authorities
deputized with such a significant task are the proper mechanisms to do
so.9 Second, anthropogenic climate change—which is largely attributable
to GHG emissions—is occurring at an unprecedented rate with devastating
effects projected to exacerbate each year.10 Policies must, therefore, provide
practicable methods to monitor emissions as well as avenues to guarantee
compliance and enforcement beyond mere discretionary statutory guidelines.11

5. SCOPING PLAN UPDATE, supra note 3, at ES-1. See also OFF. OF GOV. EDMUND
G. BROWN JR., Governor Brown to Participate in the United Nations, Climate Week NYC
and Yale Climate Conference Events, Meet with Premiers of Quebec and Ontario Canada
Next Week (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19958 [https://perma.cc/
JWA6-MGSR].
6. CARB creates and implements most GHG reduction programs in California, though
other agencies like the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and California Energy
Commission (CEC), also play supportive roles in developing these policies. See infra note
11.
7. Ramo, supra note 4, at 146 (“There are serious issues as to whether California will
be able to provide [assurance] that [offsets are rewarded for real, additional, and permanent
reductions].”).
8. Global Warming Solutions Act, AB 32, Gen. Assembly, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess.
§ 38510 (Cal. 2006) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (Deering
2018)).
9. SCOPING PLAN UPDATE, supra note 3, at 10–12. See also Andy Coghlan & Danny
Cullenward, State Constitutional Limitations on the Future of California’s Carbon Market, 37
ENERGY L.J. 219, 222 (2016) [hereinafter Coghlan & Cullenward] (“the future of California’s
cap-and-trade system has important implications for the evolution of state climate policy
as well as its interaction with sub-national climate policy structures throughout the world”).
10. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA’S 2017 CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN: THE
STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING CALIFORNIA’S 2030 GREENHOUSE GAS TARGET 6 (2017) (citing
J. Cook, et al., Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of Consensus Estimates on Humancaused Global Warming, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS (Apr. 13, 2016), 11:048002 doi:10.1088/
1748-9326/11/4/048002, iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/11/4/048002 [https://
perma.cc/UWZ3-84XG]).
11. California’s climate change laws consistently contain broad grants of discretion
to CARB concerning what policies to adopt and related program-compliance methods. See
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II. CALIFORNIA’S REGULATORY SCHEME
California’s legislature adopted statutes that provide CARB with several
options through which to regulate GHG emissions. CARB ultimately elected
to implement a cap-and-trade scheme, which “provides the only direct
constraint on exiting power plant emissions,” although its own Environmental
Justice Advisory Committee (EJAC) advised against it.12
A. Cap-and-Trade: The Economic Model for Carbon
Regulations in AB 32
AB 32 established the statewide goal of reducing GHG emissions to
1990 levels by 2020 and beyond.13 It created a multi-sector emissions cap
and emissions allowances that decline over the life of the program.14 The
Legislature designated CARB as the lead, “agency charged with monitoring
and regulating sources of emissions of [GHGs] that cause global warming
in order to reduce emissions of [GHGs].”15 CARB is responsible for, among
other things, creating and adopting regulations, “to achieve the maximum
technologically feasible and cost-effective [GHG] emission reductions
from sources or categories of sources.”16 In doing so, CARB must ensure
such regulations do not involve activities that, “disproportionately impact
low-income communities.”17 AB 32 also created EJAC to advise CARB
in developing AB 32’s Scoping Plan and implementation methods.18

infra Parts II, III, IV (discussing statutes and litigation regarding statutory language and broad
grants of discretion by the Legislature).
12. Alice Kaswan, Climate Change and Environmental Justice: Lessons from the
California Lawsuits, 5 SAN DIEGO J. OF CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 6, 9 (2014) [hereinafter
Kaswan].
13. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (Deering 2018); Jonas Monast, From
Top-Down to Bottom-Up Climate Policy: New Challenges in Carbon Market Design, 8
SAN DIEGO J. OF CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 175, 188 (2017) [hereinafter Top-Down to BottomUp Climate Policy].
14. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38510 (Deering 2018); Top-Down to BottomUp Climate Policy, supra note 13, at 187.
15. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38510 (Deering 2018).
16. Id. § 38560 (Deering 2018).
17. Id. § 38562(b) (Deering 2018). The Legislature also directed CARB to create
a Scoping Plan on or before January 1, 2009, detailing strategies for emissions reductions with
the goal of “achieving the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions
of GHG emissions,” to be updated every five years. Id. §§ 38561(a), (h) (Deering 2018).
18. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38591 (Deering 2018). EJAC is comprised of
representatives from communities with the highest exposure to air pollution and impacts
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The Legislature required CARB to “adopt regulations to require the
reporting and verification of statewide [GHG] emissions and to monitor and
enforce compliance” with the regulations by January 1, 2008.19 Additionally,
by January 1, 2008, CARB was required to determine the 1990 levels of
statewide GHG emissions and then use that determination as the limit to
be achieved by 2020.20 AB 32 further required that by January 1, 2009,
CARB prepare and approve a Scoping Plan that detailed the Agency’s
strategy to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.21
The Legislature provided several guidelines for CARB to consider while it
developed AB 32’s regulations. Unfortunately, many of the Legislature’s
guidelines prioritized concerns that are conceptually incompatible. Thus,
the resulting regulations would, in a practical effect, inevitably prioritize
some interests over others.22 For example, when creating regulations, CARB
shall minimize costs and maximize benefits to Californians—particularly
those in low-income and disadvantaged communities.23 In doing so, CARB
must minimize leakage and administrative burdens to avoid interference
with existing emissions and air quality regulations.24 CARB was thus charged
with creating least-cost regulations that benefit all Californians without
disrupting current rules, while also improving methods to capture GHG
emissions in order to minimize leakage and reduce aggregate emissions. Many
ambiguities likely resulted from such competing directives. These ambiguities
were likely exacerbated by broad grants of discretion to CARB, leaving
the Agency to its devices in designing a regulatory scheme to accomplish
its statutory directives. Despite such ambiguities, the Legislature expressly
of climate change. Id. As of this writing, there have been nineteen EJAC Meetings and
nineteen EJAC Community Meetings. CAL. AIR. RES. BD., SB 32 SCOPING PLAN (Oct. 12,
2017) [hereinafter 2017 SCOPING PLAN].
19. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530(a) (Deering 2018).
20. Id. § 38550 (Deering 2018).
21. AB 32 specifically provides that CARB shall “prepare and approve a Scoping
Plan, as that term is understood to [CARB], for achieving the maximum technologically
feasible and cost-effective reductions in [GHG] emissions from sources or categories of
sources of [GHGs] by 2020 . . . The plan shall identify and make recommendations on
direct emission reduction measures, alternative compliance mechanisms, market-based
compliance mechanisms, and potential monetary and nonmonetary incentives for sources
and categories of sources that [CARB] finds are necessary or desirable to facilitate the
achievement of the maximum feasible and cost-effective reductions of [GHG] emissions
by 2020.” Id. §§ 38561(a)-(b). The Legislature also stated that “[CARB] shall evaluate the total
potential costs and total potential economic and noneconomic benefits of the plan for reducing
[GHGs] to California’s economy, environment, and public health, using the best available
economic models, emission estimation techniques, and other scientific methods.” Id. § 38561(d).
22. See Ramo, supra note 4, at 146 (explaining how offsets attached to an
environmental justice framework are skewed because each ton acquired through offsets is
essentially permission to increase emissions by one ton); Kaswan, supra note 13, at 2–3.
23. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b) (Deering 2018).
24. Id.
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authorized the use of a market-based compliance mechanism to achieve
emissions limits pursuant to AB 32, perhaps forecasting the market-based
framework looming in California’s future.25
CARB elected to enforce AB 32 through cap-and-trade in lieu of alternative
market-based systems, like a CO2 tax, which arguably warranted more
consideration than policymakers offered.26 Under this cap-and-trade scheme,
CARB issues allowances to sources of GHG emissions regulated under
AB 32.27 Allowances permit sources to emit specified quantities of GHGs
and to trade any permitted quantities it does not plan to emit with other
regulated sources.28 Sources may also bid for additional allowances at
quarterly auctions conducted by CARB.29 CARB’s emissions auctions
produce considerable revenue,30 and the funds collected at allowance
25. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(c); id. § 38570(a) (Deering 2018).
See also Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. St. Air Res. Bd., 10 Cal. App. 5th 604 (Apr. 6, 2017),
rev. denied, No. S241948, 2017 Cal. LEXIS 4991 (June 28, 2017); Our Children’s Earth
Found. v. St. Air Res. Bd., 234 Cal. App. 4th 870, 876–77 (2015).
26. The Legislature provided that CARB’s market-based compliance mechanism
could be either:
(1) A system of market-based declining annual aggregate emissions limitations
for sources or categories of sources that emit [GHGs, or] (2) [GHG] emissions exchanges,
banking, credits, and other transactions, governed by rules and protocols established
by the state board, that result in the same greenhouse gas emission reduction,
over the same time period, as direct compliance with a [GHG] emission limit or
emission reduction measure adopted by the state board pursuant to this division.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38505(k) (Deering 2018). See also Joanna D. Malaczynski &
Timothy P. Duane, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Vehicle Miles Traveled:
Integrating the California Environmental Quality Act with the California Global Warming
Solutions Act, 36 ECOLOGY L. Q. 71, 87–88 n.96 (2009) (explaining the little discussion and
consideration policy makers devoted to potentially “far-ranging impacts” GHG-related taxes
might have on emissions).
27. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562 (Deering 2018).
28. Id. See also Malaczynski, supra note 26, at 89–90 (providing a general
explanation of AB 32’s cap-and-trade model); A. DANNY ELLERMAN, PAUL L. JOSKOW, DAVID
HARRISON, EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.: EXPERIENCE, LESSONS, AND CONSIDERATIONS
FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 5–6 (2003) (defining key terms and features of emissions trading
programs), http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/PewCtr_MIT_Rpt_Ellerman.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L9QZ-2557].
29. See CAL. CODE REGS., tit.17, §§ 95911(a), (e) (Deering 2018). See also CAL. AIR
RES. BD., Auction Information, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/auction.htm
[https://perma.cc/XDL9-6MTE] (providing information auction participation, bidding, and
clearing prices at auction).
30. Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. St. Air Res. Bd., 10 Cal. App. 5th 617, 604 (2017).
Allowance auctions from 2016 through August 27, 2017, alone generated roughly $5 billion
in revenue. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., 2017-18 CAP-AND-TRADE EXPENDITURE PLAN (Aug.
24, 2017), http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/resources/2017/Senate-Cap-and-Trade-Expenditure-
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auctions are diverted to the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund to be
appropriated to further the purposes of AB 32.31
Furthermore, a regulated, “entity can also use offsets to meet a percentage
of its compliance obligation under the program . . . [A]n offset is a voluntary
reduction of a source that is not directly covered by the Cap-and-Trade program
which is used by a [regulated] entity to comply with the program’s GHG
emissions cap.”32 Sources do not receive allowance credits for an offset
unless CARB determines that it is, “real, additional, quantifiable, permanent,
verifiable, and enforceable.”33
CARB initially proposed a ten percent limit on the use of offsets to meet
emissions limits,34 but it ultimately decided that each source may use carbon
offsets to meet up to forty-nine percent of its emissions reductions.35 Although
CARB has already taken steps to delineate offset projects that might provide
potentially legitimate offsets,36 the threshold performance standards for
each offset category, “would [likely] act as non-rebuttable presumptions
that the activity would be real and additional.”37
In the years after cap-and-trade went into effect, the Legislature acted
to provide sources regulated under AB 32 with assurance that allowances
Plan-082417.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5A3-4KJQ] [hereinafter 2017-18 CAP-AND-TRADE
EXPENDITURE PLAN]. See generally, CAL. AIR RES. BD., California Climate Investments,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auctionproceeds/auctionproceeds.htm [https://
perma.cc/23DW-TSUQ].
31. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 16428.8 (Deering 2018). One case below challenging AB 32
concerns auctions revenues and appropriation of funds from the Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Fund and additional fees paid by regulated sources to CARB. See infra, Ass’n of Irritated
Residents v. St. Air. Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487 (2012) (Irritated Residents); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38597 (Deering 2018). AB 32 also includes an administrative
fee provision that permits CARB to:
adopt . . . a schedule of fees to be paid by the sources of [GHG] emissions regulated
pursuant to this division, consistent with Section 57001. The revenues collected
pursuant to this section, shall be deposited into the Air Pollution Control Fund
and are available upon appropriation, by the Legislature, for purposes of carrying out
this division.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38597 (Deering 2018).
32. Our Children’s Earth Found. v. St. Air Res. Bd., 234 Cal. App. 4th 870, 877 (2015)
(citing AB 32).
33. 17 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95970(a)(1). Cf. Ramo, supra note 4, at 123.
34. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE DRAFT SCOPING PLAN DISCUSSION DRAFT
19 (2008), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/draftscopingplan.pdf.
35. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK
FOR CHANGE 37 (2008), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/scopingplan
document.htm [https://perma.cc/6MME-9D6G].
36. See generally CAL. AIR RES. BD., CAP-AND-TRADE COMPLIANCE OFFSET PROGRAM,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm [https://perma.cc/VB7J-6ZRS].
37. Ramo, supra note 4, at 126. “The [C]ARB hoped that these performance standards
could shortcut project approval, minimize the intensity of project-by-project review yet
assure the integrity of an offset award.” Id.
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obtained would continue to hold “value” beyond 2020.38 The California
Legislature passed SB 32 in 2016, effectively extending the California Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 through 2030.39 SB 32 set a new statewide
goal for GHG emissions reductions of 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030,40
but there were otherwise no substantive differences between AB 32 and
SB 32. Instead, SB 32 is intended to build upon programs established pursuant
to AB 32 by achieving new goals set for 2030 and is, “designed specifically
to continue California’s leadership in the fight against climate change.”41
The Legislature solidified California’s commitment to the cap-and-trade
regime in 2017 when it passed AB 398 by a two-thirds supermajority vote.42
Other recently passed laws, and those likely to pass in the near future, will
likely be significant additions to California’s climate change regulatory
framework.43
38. The Legislature only provided in AB 32 that the program was to run until 2020,
with emissions reduction efforts to subsist after the program expired—there was no indication
that allowances would have worth beyond 2020. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., ASSEMBLY BILL
32 OVERVIEW: WHAT IS THE TIMELINE FOR IMPLEMENTING AB 32, https://www.arb.ca.gov/
cc/ab32/ab32.htm [https://perma.cc/73WN-84VA].
39. S.B. 32, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB32 [https://perma.cc/C63Q-EGSQ].
40. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38501(h), 38566 (2016) (“In adopting
rules and regulations to achieve the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective
greenhouse gas emissions reductions authorized by this division, the state board shall ensure
that statewide greenhouse gas emissions are reduced to at least 40 percent below the statewide
greenhouse gas emissions limit no later than December 31, 2030.”). SB 32 was the codified
product of Executive Order B-30-15 which established the goal of 40 percent reduction in
1990 GHG emissions levels by 2030. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., Public Workshop 2017:
Scoping Plan Update, The Proposed Strategy for Achieving California Greenhouse Gas
Target (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/meetings/101217/sp-octoberworkshop-slides.pdf.
41. SCOPING PLAN UPDATE, supra note 3, at 40. SB 32’s Scoping Plan Update was created
with “guidance” from several state agencies, departments, and public comment, and EJAC.
Id. at ES-1-2, 21-25.
42. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38562, 38590, 38591.1–38591.3, 38592.5
(Deering 2018) (available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=
201720180AB398 [https://perma.cc/CV9Z-W3TC]).
43. See S.B. 375, The Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008
(2007–2008 Reg. Sess.), CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65080(b)(2)(A)(iv) (requiring CARB to
update regional GHG reduction targets every eight years consistent with the time in which
regional metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) must update regional transportation
plans under federal law, before MPOs submit a “sustainable communities strategy” to
CARB. CARB may revise GHG targets every four years if alternative plans that would
reduce GHGs in the affected regions). Although SB 32 is the future of GHG regulations
in California, it is not operative until AB 32 expires in 2020. SB 32 is intended to extend
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III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION GRANTS BROAD DISCRETION TO
CARB UNDER AB 32, THE CALIFORNIA GLOBAL
WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT OF 2006
The Legislature directed CARB to design methodologies to reduce statewide
GHG emissions under least-cost, maximum-benefit strategies that ultimately
create the greatest net environmental and economic benefits to the state.44
On their face, these directives instruct CARB to produce regulations that
achieve competing objectives. CARB’s regulations must improve air quality
and citizens’ health, but only to the extent that it is economical—a timeless
balance of environmental and fiscal interests45 would lead to dissatisfaction
among the stakeholders. Many agree that the environmental justice community
was reasonably frustrated when AB 32 left virtually no avenues to ensure
that CARB abides by the directive to develop policies that seek to benefit—
or at least improve—emissions impacts on low-income and disadvantaged
communities (DACs).46
A. Language of the Enabling Statute Effectuates Agency Authority
CARB’s authority under AB 32 is a function of the language used by
the Legislature to authorize agency action. California law provides that when
a statute grants quasi-legislative authority to an agency, it effectively delegates
legislative power to that agency.47 Thus, regulations established by an agency
pursuant to quasi-legislative statutory directives have the effect of substantive
law. When legislatures fail to provide parameters, or when those provided
are extremely broad, questions of abuse of discretion logically accompany
an agency’s interpretation of a particular statute.

the purpose and general structure of AB 32, so the remainder of this Article will focus on
litigation around AB 32 and related theories which will likely subsist through 2020.
44. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(h) (“It is the intent of the Legislature
that the [CARB] design emissions reduction measures to meet the statewide emissions
limits for [GHGs] established pursuant to this division in a manner that minimizes costs
and maximizes benefits for California’s economy . . . maximizes additional environmental
and economic co-benefits for California, and complements the state’s efforts to improve
air quality.”).
45. Id. § 38501(e) (explaining that California’s leadership in climate change policy
will benefit the state’s economy, financial institutions, and businesses); id. § 38570(b)(3)
(requiring CARB to “maximize additional environmental and economic benefits for California,
as appropriate”).
46. See id. §§ 38565, 38562(b)(2); Kaswan, supra note 12, at 3–5 (“The explicit attention
to environmental justice considerations throughout the statute undoubtedly created expectations
within the environmental justice community that their concerns would play a key role in
the statute’s implementation.”).
47. Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. St. Bd. of Equalization, 960 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Cal.4th
1998) (emphasis added).
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The Legislature gave CARB the option to adopt cap-and-trade to regulate
statewide GHG emissions reductions.48 AB 32 specifically states that:
[CARB] may adopt a regulation that establishes a system of market-based declining
annual aggregate emissions limits for sources or categories of sources that emit
[GHG] emissions, applicable from January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2020 . . .
that [CARB] determines will achieve . . . reductions in [GHG] emissions, in the
aggregate, from those sources or categories of sources.49

This directive represents the Legislature’s acquiescence for CARB to
create market-based regulations but in no way required the Agency to do
so. The cap-and-trade program was largely the result of former Governor
Schwarzenegger’s Executive Order promulgated in 2006, which effectively
directed CARB to develop market-based regulations for AB 32.50
Furthermore, the Legislature consistently used the word “shall” when it
granted CARB’s authority to use a market-based compliance mechanism.51
The Legislature’s use of “shall”—instead of language like “must” or “will”
—indicates a discretionary consideration whereby CARB may create regulations
that meet these statutory parameters.52 Similar non-obligatory directives
are used by parties to international agreements to deliberately avoid imposing
binding obligations on sovereign states.53 The practical effect of such language
permits sovereigns to devote as much or as little consideration to achieving
48. See Kaswan, supra note 12, at 4–5.
49. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(a) (West 2018) (emphasis added). See also
id. § 38562(c).
50. See Kaswan, supra note 12, at 4–6. Because the environmental justice committee
resisted against including “must” in AB 32, the Legislature instead included “may” to avoid a
legally mandatory market-based program. Id. As a result, Governor Schwarzenegger
passed Executive Order No. S-20-06 to establish a “Market Advisory Committee” to guide
state agencies in developing a market-based compliance program, i.e., cap-and-trade. See
Exec. Order No. S-20-06 (Oct. 18, 2006). See also MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL.
AIR RES. BD., Recommendations for Designing a Cap-and-Trade System for California
(2007), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/proposedplan-ejaccommentsfinaldec10.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HR66-TJAU].
51. Id. §§ 38570–38574 (Deering 2018). “Shall” appears in several provisions of both
AB 32 and SB 32. Id.; S.B. 32, supra note 39.
52. Cf. Malaczynski, supra note 26, at n.241 (arguing that a word like “can” provides
agencies with more discretion in fulfilling statutory obligations than words like “shall”
and “must”).
53. See, e.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, Art. 4.2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) (“Parties shall
pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such
contributions.”) (emphasis added). The Paris Agreement is available at https://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PY2-7UR3].
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goals of international agreements, just as CARB is not obligated to promulgate
regulations that satisfy all parameters.
Accordingly, some sections that include “shall” also contain language
that grant broad authority. For example, section 38562 subsection (b) concerns
allowance auctions and provides that:
. . . . [i]n adopting regulations . . . to the extent feasible and in furtherance of achieving
the statewide [GHG] emissions limit, [CARB] shall do all of the following: (1) Design
the regulations, including distribution of emissions allowances where appropriate, in
a manner that is equitable, seeks to minimize costs and maximize the total benefits to
California, and encourages early action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.54

This section provides CARB with authority to implement an allowance
distribution system and exceptionally broad guidelines to design it. Because
the Legislature left the system design to CARB’s discretion but suggested
the equitable, allowance-based system, it fundamentally authorized allowance
auctions.55 AB 32 further provides that CARB’s regulations must guarantee
that, “reductions achieved are real, permanent, quantifiable, verifiable, and
enforceable by [CARB].”56 Unsurprisingly, CARB also has authority over
methodologies to determine whether reductions are real, permanent,
quantifiable, verifiable, and enforceable.57 Under this authority, CARB alone
sets threshold performance standards and baselines against which all regulated
emissions are measured.58
In other provisions of AB 32, the Legislature provides CARB with
numerous, often competing “directives” and leaves achievement methods
entirely to the agency.59 Thus, when left to evaluate many factors, CARB
is not held responsible for ensuring that all delegated goals are achieved.60
This issue is perhaps most salient in the offset provisions of statute, which
provide that any offset project undertaken by a regulated source to offset
its own emissions must be “additional,” in that the emissions reduction is
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b) (Deering 2018) (emphasis added).
55. Ramo, supra note 4, at 111–12 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(b)).
See, e.g., Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. St. Air Res. Bd., 10 Cal. App. 5th 604, 619 (2017)
(concluding in reference to allowance auctions “the Legislature conferred on the [CARB]
extremely broad discretion to craft a distribution system”) (emphasis added).
56. Id. § 38562(d)(1) (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. See Ramo, supra note 4, at 126 (“The threshold performance standards would
act as nonrebuttable presumptions that the activity would be real and additional. CARB
hoped that these performance standards could shortcut project approval, minimize the
intensity of project-by-project review yet assure the integrity of an offset award.”).
59. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38562(b), (c).
60. See Citizens Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Statement of Decision CGC12-519554 (Statement of Decision) (Jan. 25, 2013) (“The Legislature delegates authority
to agencies to promulgate using their best judgement based on the current available
information.”).
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not one that “otherwise would occur” under a business-as-usual scenario.61
The Legislature defines “conservative business-as-usual” for additionality
determinations as a scenario that is, “more likely than not to understate net
GHG reductions.”62 This issue is ripe for litigation because the Legislature
only vaguely describes additionality standards, which renders CARB’s
responsibility to police offsets63 highly problematic.
The Legislature delegated almost indeterminable amounts of discretion
to CARB.64 However, the most troublesome discretionary grants exist in the
enforcement and compliance provisions of California’s regulatory framework.
As seen in cases below, the intermixing of language that appears obligatory
with broad grants of discretion provides the agency with peak authority.
B. Quasi-Legislative Regulations Provide an Agency with
Lawmaking Power65
As discussed above, quasi-legislative regulations are rules created by
regulatory agencies pursuant to authority granted by the Legislature.66
The concept is best summarized as follows:
[B]ecause agencies granted . . . substantive rulemaking power are truly “making
law,” their quasi-legislative rules have the dignity of statutes. When a court assesses
the validity of such rules, the scope of review is narrow. If satisfied that the rule . . .
lay within the lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature, and that it is reasonably
necessary to implement the purpose of the statute, judicial review is at its end.67

However, when the Legislature delegates power to an agency to interpret
key statutory terms, the judicial scrutiny applied to determine the scope of
61. Requirements for Offset Projects Using ARB Compliance Offset Protocols, CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95973 (Deering 2018). “Any” reduction additional to what would otherwise
occur under a business-as-usual scenario delineates no preciseness or accountability for
CARB’s methods. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35862(d)(2); Ramo, supra note 4, at
110–11.
62. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(58) (Deering 2018).
63. E.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95977.1, 95983, 96014 (2017) (emphasis added).
64. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(a) (Deering 2018) (“. . . [CARB]
shall prepare and approve a scoping plan, as that term is understood by the [CARB], for
achieving the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions. . .”) (emphasis
added).
65. E.g., Am. Coating Ass’n, Inc. v. S. Coast Air Quality Dist., 54 Cal. 4th 446, 460
(2012).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 48–49.
67. Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. St. Bd. of Equalization, 960 P.2d 1031, 1036 (Cal. 4th
1998).
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this interpretive authority is viewed along a continuum—with nonreviewability
(more deferential) at one end and independent judgment (little to no agency
deference) at the other.68 California courts will infer that the Legislature
intended to grant interpretive authority when a statute uses broad language
to provide an agency with rulemaking authority.69 Courts must therefore
determine, “whether the agency regulation is within the scope of the authority
conferred . . . [which] includes an inquiry into the extent to which the
Legislature intended to delegate discretion to the agency to construe or
elaborate on the authorizing statute.”70
In such instances, California courts analyze whether the “instant
interpretation falls within the agency’s delegated lawmaking authority.”71
If a court finds that the agency was in delegated interpretive authority by
the Legislature such that the regulation is consistent with the statute, the
court then applies an arbitrary and capricious standard of review72 to
determine, “whether the regulation is reasonably necessary to effectuate
the enabling statute’s purpose.”73 In reviewing the agency’s exercise of
discretion, “the scope of review is limited out of deference to the agency’s
authority and presumed expertise . . . [and] the court must ensure that an agency
has adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational
connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of
the enabling statute.”74

68. Id. at 1033. This standard originated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council et al. when the Supreme Court decided the United States Environmental
Protection (EPA) had interpretive authority under certain provisions of the Clean Air Act.
467 U.S. 837 (1984). After Chevron, courts must defer to the policy judgments of executive
agencies, like the EPA, when a statute is either ambiguous or appears to provide the agency
with authority to interpret statutory text and effectuate the purposes of the legislation as
the agency sees fit. Id. See e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 3 DUKE L.J. 511, 514 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia].
69. Yamaha 960 P.2d at 1041 (Mosk, J., concurring). In contrast, the Legislature’s
use of specific or comprehensive or language provides agencies with little discretion. Id.
70. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
71. Citizens Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CGC-12-519554, 2013 Cal.
Super LEXIS 7826, at *36 (Jan. 25, 2013) (citing Am. Coatings Ass’n, 54 Cal. 4th 466
(2012); Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 785 (1999); Moore v. Cal. St.
Bd. of Accountancy, 2 Cal. 4th 999 (1992)). This is the first step of the Yamaha Doctrine,
a judicial doctrine used to analyze actions of administrative and regulatory agencies. See
Yamaha, 960 P.2d at 1036–37.
72. See id. at 1031–46 (holding the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review
provides extraordinary deference to the agency’s interpretation of its statutorily granted
authority).
73. Citizens Climate Lobby, 2013 Cal. Super LEXIS 7826, at *37 (citing Communities
for a Better Envt. v. Cal. Res. Agency, 103 Cal. App. 4th 98, 108 (2002)).
74. Id. (quoting Am. Bd. of Cosmetic Surgery v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 162 Cal. App.
4th 534, 547–48 (internal quotation marks omitted) (2008)).
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In California, a regulation is valid if it is: “(1) consistent and not in conflict
with the statute and (2) reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
statute.”75 This analysis is the codified version of the Yamaha Doctrine, a
judicial doctrine invoked when a claimant challenges the actions or regulations
of an administrative agency. As long as the first prong is within the scope
of the authority conferred in the statute, then an administrative regulation
is valid.76 After the court determines the regulation is valid, it moves to
the second prong which affords even more deference to the agency. Under
the second prong, a court will strike down a regulation as invalid only if
it is, “arbitrary, capricious, or without reasonable or rational basis.”77 Given
the statutory authorities granted to CARB, the arbitrary and capricious
standard of judicial review has proven exceptionally easy for the agency
to overcome in cases challenging its implementation of AB 32.
IV. BROAD GRANTS OF DISCRETION THWART JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF AB 32
A. Cases Challenging CARB’s Regulations Under AB 32
No cases that challenged CARB’s authority under AB 32 ever reached
the merits of the allegations. Instead, courts have focused on whether the
judiciary should play a role in assessing challenges to CARB’s authority,
as the Legislature statutorily dedicated to the agency the authority to make
policy judgments concerning AB 32’s implementation. Under Yamaha,
the agency, not the court, is in the best position to determine how AB
32 goals are achieved. Because courts refrain from invading the technical
expertise of the agency, CARB may determine whether offsets are real,
verifiable, and additional or whether allowance auctions are necessarily
authorized under AB 32.78
The first case involving a challenge to CARB’s methodologies implementing
AB 32 was Association of Irritated Residents v. State Air Resources Board.79

75. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11342.2 (Deering 2018); Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. St. Bd.
of Equalization, 960 P.2d 1031 (Cal. 4th 1998).
76. Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. St. Air Res. Bd., 10 Cal. App. 5th 604, 619 (citing
Morningstar Co. v. St. Bd. of Equalization, 201 Cal. App. 4th 737, 744–45 (2011)).
77. Morning Star, 201 Cal. App. 4th at 744–45.
78. See Yamaha, 960 P.2d at 1031; Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 10 Cal. App. 5th at
604.
79. 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487 (2012). See Ramo, supra note 4, at 142 (“In the first case
squarely addressing the implementation of AB 32 . . .”).
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Environmental groups challenged different aspects of the 2008 Scoping Plan
CARB published to demonstrate the Agency’s implementation plans for
AB 32 regulations. Petitioners alleged the Scoping Plan failed to comply with
statutory requirements of AB 32, particularly the mandate requiring CARB
to consider health impacts to communities located near regulated sources.80
The court rejected Petitioners’ argument under Yamaha, holding that CARB
did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in crafting the Scoping Plan and, contrary
to Petitioner’s argument, CARB did not ignore statutory requirements.81
Instead, the challenged provisions of AB 32 were held to be “exceptionally
broad and open-ended,” which left, “virtually all decisions to the discretion
of [CARB].”82
B. Broad Deference, or Limitless Deference?
Then in 2012, two environmental groups challenged CARB’s offset
approval methodologies in Citizens Climate Lobby v. California Air Resources
Board.83 The groups challenged CARB’s “additionality” methodology.
However, Petitioners’ argument was problematic because it required proving
80. Ass’n of Irritated Residents, 206 Cal. App. 4th at 1489, 1504. See S.B. 535, ch. 830
Stats. of 2012 (Cal. 2012), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?
bill_id=201120120SB535 [https://perma.cc/4D2B-56Y3].
81. Petitioner challenged whether CARB ignored guidelines to adopt the most costeffective and economically-feasible mechanisms to achieve GHG reductions. Irritated Residents,
206 Cal. App. 4th at 1495–97.
82. Id. at 1495 (“The Board is directed to ‘consult with all state agencies with jurisdiction
over sources of greenhouse gases’ and to receive public input, to ‘consider all relevant
information pertaining to [GHG] emissions reduction programs’ in other jurisdictions, to
‘evaluate the total potential costs and total potential economic and noneconomic benefits
of the plan . . . to California’s economy, environment, and public health, using the best available
economic models, emission estimation techniques, and other scientific methods’ and, ultimately,
to ‘identify and make recommendations on direct emission reduction measures, alternative
compliance mechanism[s], market-based compliance mechanisms, and potential monetary
and nonmonetary incentives for sources and categories of sources that the [Board] finds are
necessary and desirable to facilitate the achievement of the maximum feasible and
cost-effective reductions of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.’ These directives are
exceptionally broad and open-ended. They leave virtually all decisions to the discretion of
the Board, from determining the nature of a scoping plan, to determining the best available
research techniques, to determining incentives for emissions reduction that are ‘necessary
and desirable,’ to weighing economic, environmental and public health benefits, to determining
what is most ‘feasible and cost-effective.’”) (second italics added). See Our Children’s Earth
Found. v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 234 Cal. App. 4th 870, 888 (2015).
83. Citizens Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CGC-12-519554, 2013 Cal.
Super LEXIS 7826, at *10 (Mar. 25, 2013). The trial court explained the “[a]dditionality
is essential to the environmental integrity of an offset program because if reductions are
not additional, then the cap-and-trade program will not reduce GHG emissions beyond what
would have occurred anyway . . . [and non-additional offsets] undercut[] the cap-and-trade
program because [they] substitute[] illusory reductions, those that would have occurred
anyway, for real reductions that the capped sources should have undertaken.” Id.
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that something would have happened without an offset, i.e., a conservative
business-as-usual scenario, which is generally a debatable concept.84 Because
Offset Protocols assume a “standard additionality mechanism” in each offset
circumstance, CARB’s protocols assume a behavior. This, as Petitioners
argued, will produce skewed offsets and additionality measurements because
it would result in CARB accepting any offset where the activity exceeds
a standard performance in that particular activity.85 The District Court
essentially rejected Petitioners’ arguments on grounds that Petitioners’
“project-based” approach, i.e., for CARB to evaluate each offset individually,
was just as problematic and uncertain as CARB’s “standards-based” approach
to offsets, in regards to accurately proving offset data.86
Next, in Our Children’s Earth Foundation v. State Air Resources Board,87
Petitioners again challenged CARB’s standards-based approach.88 The court
ultimately reasoned the offset program at most provides a “more likely than
not” assurance, but that, “each offset protocol also explicitly requires
compliance with the additionality requirements in the regulation.” In other
words, the cap-and-trade program regulation establishes a standards-based
mechanism to ensure GHG emission reductions that generate offset credits
are in addition to reductions that would otherwise occur, and the offset
protocols are an integral part of that mechanism. Because “[CARB] has
statutory authority to establish a market-based compliance mechanism which
employs a standards-based approach for ensuring additionality, it did not
exceed that authority by using standards-based protocols to implement that
mechanism.”89

84. See Kaswan, supra note 12, at 17 (“Determining whether reductions are ‘additional’
is an inherently challenging enterprise because it requires assessing what would have happened
in the absence of the offset program, always a matter of debate.”).
85. Id. at 17 (explaining why CARB’s presumptions in each offset protocol create
a “undercutting” issues that the discussed). See infra note 86.
86. Id. at 18 (citing Citizen’s Climate Lobby, 2013 Cal. Super LEXIS 7826, at *11).
See also id. (“The Court held that individual project assessments are equally problematic
given the difficulty of assessing future emissions and future behavior on a project-by-project
basis. It observed that offset programs engaged in project-based assessments, like the Kyoto
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, had encountered numerous inaccuracies,
difficulties, and costs that rendered them as or more uncertain than CARB’s chosen standardsbased approach. The Court stated that its role was not ‘to decide that one methodology
trumps another when decisions are made based on extensive research, stakeholder input,
public input, and fact-based analysis.’”).
87. 234 Cal. App. 4th 870 (2015).
88. Id. at 889.
89. Id. at 890.
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The court rejected Petitioners’ arguments that the standards-based approach
violated AB 3290 because not only does CARB have authority to craft
additionality assessments as it sees fit, but Petitioners’ proffered alternative—
the performance-based approach—was equally as unsatisfying in its accuracy
of offset measurements.91
It is, however, worth noting the court’s final word in its rejection of
Petitioners’ performance-based approach: “Appellant’s theory when taken to
its logical conclusion is that there is no approach which can establish that
an offset is additional because the 2006 Act demands a degree of certainty
that can never be satisfied.”92 Thus, the court rejected an alternative
methodology to CARB’s selected protocol on the grounds that both were
unverifiable. This is not a welcome justification in most fields, let alone
the climate change realm, which prioritizes scientific certainty more than
most.
Then in California Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd.93 in 2017,
a California citizen filed suit against CARB in the hopes of invalidating
AB 32’s allowance auctions. Many of Petitioners’ arguments focused on
the breadth of the statute and the lack of specific authorization from the
Legislature to conduct the auctions without first obtaining the two-thirds
supermajority required to pass regulations that qualify as taxes under
Proposition 26.94 Proposition 26 amended the California Constitution in
2010 to provide that any changes in state statutes resulting in a higher
tax—defined as “any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by the

90. See Citizen’s Climate Lobby, 2013 Cal. Super LEXIS 7826, at *37–38 (“Petitioners
urge the court to find that standards-based approaches to additionality are impermissible
because they enlarge the Act’s scope by making non-additional reductions eligible for
offset credits . . . [Petitioners] contend an arbitrary and capricious standard applies because
[CARB] was delegated the authority to interpret additionality.”) The court found the Act
contained “‘exceptionally broad and open-ended’ sections that leave ‘virtually all decisions to
the discretion of [CARB]’” because the Legislature included nine factors to consider in
creating a comprehensive regulatory program to reduce GHG emissions. Our Children’s Earth
Found., 234 Cal. App. 4th at 875, 888 (citing Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. St. Air Res.
Bd., 206 Cal. App 4th 1787, 1495 (2012)).
91. Id. at 890 (“Second, appellant’s conception of a ‘performance standards-based
approach,’ which ‘ensures that no project that would otherwise occur would be allowed to
generate offset credits,’ incorporates the same unworkable definition of the statutory
requirement.”).
92. Id.
93. 10 Cal. App. 5th 604 (2017). Prior history of this consolidated case includes Morning
Star, where a state trial court accepted the state’s argument that allowance auctions were
valid “regulatory fees” and not taxes under Sinclair Paint v. State Board of Equalization
and Proposition 13 of the California Constitution. Morning Star Co. v. Bd. of Equalization,
201 Cal. App. 4th 737 (2011); Coghlan & Cullenward, supra note 9, at 221–22. See also
Sinclair Paint v. St. Bd. of Equalization, 15 Cal. 4th 866, 881 (1997).
94. Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 10 Cal. App. 5th at 621.
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State” with specified exceptions—must pass a two-thirds supermajority
vote in the state Legislature.95
The California Chamber of Commerce court stated that legislative silence
on holding allowance auctions did not prevent CARB from holding the
auction.96 Rather, because AB 32 provides, “explicit delegation to [CARB]
to design a method to distribute allowances . . . [the] agency exercise[d]
discretion explicitly conferred on it, [and] it is presumed to act within legislative
intent.”97 The court further explained that the agency, not the court, is in
the best position to determine how legislatively delegated objectives are
achieved, including whether to hold the allowance auctions.98
The court rejected Petitioners’ “breadth” argument, reasoning that AB
32’s language is broad enough to encompass the emissions allowances and
the accompanying allowance auctions. The court explained, “the auction
regulations are ‘consistent and not in conflict with’ the organic statute,”
as required under Yamaha.99 When the court rejected Petitioners’ argument
that CARB must receive explicit authorization from the Legislature to adopt
regulations to hold emissions auctions under the cap-and-trade program, it
did so based on an inference.100 The court inferred the Legislature’s broad
allocation of authority reflected a desire for CARB to create, “a massive,
historic, and immediate change in behavior regarding GHG emissions . . .
[so] the lack of explicit legislative discussion of one subcomponent of one
possible emissions reduction system (that is, adoption of a cap-and-trade
95. CAL. CONST., art. XIII A, §§ 3(a)–(b).
96. Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 10 Cal. App. 5th at 625–26.
97. Id. at 620.
98. Id. at 626.
99. Id. at 620 (quoting Morning Star, 201 Cal. App. 4th at 747).
100. Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 10 Cal. App. 5th at 613–22. The reviewing court
reasoned against all of the following challenges that petitioners brought against CARB’s
emissions auctions:
(1) the statute does not explicitly authorize [CARB] to auction allowances; (2) the
legislative history includes no discussion of the term ‘auction;’ (3) at the time of
AB 32’s enactment, most cap-and-trade program allowances were distributed for
free; (4) construing AB 32 as authorizing the sale of allowances renders administrative
fee provision of the Act ( [§] 38597) surplusage; (5) the chief sponsor of AB 32
(ostensibly) assured his colleagues on the floor of the Legislature, just before the
vote, that the only funds to be generated under AB 32 were those generated by
the administrative fee provision; (6) there is no guidance in AB 32 as to how to
spend any auction revenues; and (7) the Legislature failed to enact a bill in 2009
that would have expressly authorized [the Board] to auction the allowances.
Id. (quoting Our Children’s Earth Found. v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 234 Cal. App. 4th 870, 877
(2015)).
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program rather than a command-and-control program) is of no moment.”101
The court also rejected Petitioner’s argument that administrative fees under
section 38597 of the Act102 precluded CARB from generating further revenue
through another mechanism, reasoning that section 38597 is merely a
“pedestrian measure” to fund administrative costs of implementing CARB’s
programs under the Act.103 The opinion even discussed Petitioner Morning
Star’s arguments regarding 2009 legislation that would have permitted the
auctions used by CARB, and because the legislation did not pass, this
evidenced legislative intent to disfavor the auctions.104
1. Are They Really the Experts?
Under Yamaha, courts are not bound by an agency’s interpretation of its
authority under a particular statute but must defer to the agency’s interpretation
in a quasi-legislative regulation.105 Here, the judiciary merely assumes
agencies are the experts in each proceeding because the judiciary neither
analyzes the pertinent data nor has experience in the subject matter with
which the agency works.106 “In other words, [the agency is] more likely than

101. Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 10 Cal. App. 5th at 626. The court also rejected a related
argument advanced by Morning Star (a Plaintiff the from consolidated case) concerning
the failure of a 2009 bill which would have provided explicit authorization—thus evidencing
legislative intent—for CARB to hold allowance auctions. See id. at 629–30 (citing S.B.
31, Reg. Sess. 2009–2010 § 2 (Cal. 2009) (amend. 2010)). The court reasoned, “that ‘the
failure of the Legislature to enact the proposed bill, in one form or another, is some evidence
that the Legislature does not consider it necessary or proper or expedient to enact such
legislation.’” Id. (quoting Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6 (1962)).
102. Section 38597 provides CARB may create, “a schedule of fees to be paid by the
sources of [GHG] emissions regulated pursuant to this division, consistent with Section
57001. The revenues collected . . . shall be deposited into the Air Pollution Control Fund
and are available upon appropriation, by the Legislature, for purposes of carrying out this
division.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38597 (West 2007). Section 57001 applies to
many fees and requires, “that the amount of each fee is not more than is reasonably necessary
to fund the efficient operation of the activities or programs for which the fee is assessed.”
Id. § 57001(a) (Deering 2018).
103. Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 10 Cal. App. 5th at 616 (citing CAL. CODE REGS., tit.
17, §§ 95200–95207 (Deering 2018)).
104. Morning Star argued that because CARB did not prove auction charges were not
taxes under Proposition 26, the 2012 legislation ratifying auction regulations was barred
by Proposition 26. See Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 10 Cal. App. 5th at 632–33. The court
rejected this argument because the 2012 legislation did not increase any state-imposed
charges, but rather it merely, “specified how the proceeds of auctions sales would be handled.”
Id. at 633–34.
105. Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. St. Bd. of Equalization, 960 P.2d 1031, 1037 (Cal. 4th 1998).
106. See Scalia, supra note 68, at 515 (explaining that Chevron deference to administrative
interpretations relies on agency expertise and practical knowledge regarding purposes of
legislation at issue and how to “best effectuate those purposes.”).
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the courts to reach the correct result.”107 Nevertheless, courts prefer deference
over advancing a challenge against CARB’s regulatory authority.108
V. ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS TO ACHIEVE GOALS OF AB 32
Case law discussed above demonstrates a trend of judicial deference to
CARB. The foundation of this trend rests in California courts’ understanding
that the Legislature intended to delegate to CARB the authority to regulate
statewide GHG emissions and, in doing so, authorized the use of marketbased regulatory mechanisms. Because precedent all but solidifies CARB’s
statutory authority, these arguments will likely continue to thwart lawsuits
challenging the Agency’s enforcement or its assertions that actual reductions
are being achieved. This reality suggests that alternative mechanisms—other
than constitutional and taxation challenges109—are necessary to ensure that
CARB responsibly exercises its statutory authority and obeys legislative
directives to reduce statewide GHG emissions.
A. Regulatory Alternatives
GHGs should be regulated under a system that complements other statewide
and, when possible, regional and national programs.110 Currently, favored
107. Id. at 514.
108. See Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 10 Cal. App. 5th at 626 (“[T]he Legislature
chose to pass a flexible bill, with the understanding that the [CARB], as the agency with
expertise in air quality matters, was better equipped to study [GHG emissions] and design
a program to effectuate those goals.”); Ass’n of Cal. Ins. Co.’s v. Jones, 2 Cal. 5th 376,
390 (2017).
109. The “constitutional doubt” doctrine applies only to statutes that are susceptible
to two plausible interpretations, and the doctrine does not apply to questions about delegation
or Proposition 13 as they pertain to AB 32. See Cal. Chamber of Commerce, 10 Cal. App.
5th at 631–32. E.g., Harrott v. Cty. of Kings, 25 Cal. 4th 1138, 1153 (2001) (“If a statute
is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other
unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions,
the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable
meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as
to its constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable. The basis
of this rule is the presumption that the Legislature intended, not to violate the Constitution,
but to enact a valid statute within the scope of its constitutional powers.”).
110. The Editors, Opinion, Who Should Regulate Greenhouse Gases?, N.Y. TIMES:
ROOM FOR DEBATE BLOG (Feb. 19, 2009, 4:35 PM) [https://perma.cc/42VJ-2TQS].
Because GHGs have the same impact on earth’s climate regardless of the location in which they
are emitted, coordinated efforts which complement other climate change policies provide
streamlined and often less-costly mechanisms to attain emissions reductions. Id.
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regulatory policies designed to reduce GHG emissions are market-based
systems like cap-and-trade and CO2 taxes on regulated sources.111 Although
the Legislature directed CARB to consider alternatives to cap-and-trade
in deciding how to regulate GHG emissions, it left the decision to CARB
to select the market-based mechanism through which to achieve AB 32’s
goals.112 The ultimate question thus becomes: Is cap-and-trade the best
approach to reduce GHG emissions?
For now, the answer is yes—cap-and-trade is the best mechanism to
regulate GHGs. Cap-and-trade is an optimal regulatory approach because
it avoids specified pricing of emissions under CO2 tax regimes. Instead, it
uses incentives to reduce GHG emissions and lets the marketplace determine
costs of reductions.113 Furthermore, if reductions are more difficult to achieve
than expected, consequences under cap-and-trade are more favorable than
those under more rigid regulatory alternatives. Consequences under capand-trade include higher compliance costs with diminished production of
goods or services from regulated sources, whereas consequences under a
CO2 tax include less emissions reductions when it is cheaper for regulated
sources to continue emitting at current levels and pay for noncompliance
rather than pay a (likely costly) tax.114 Additionally, a rigid regulatory approach
that specifies the amount and method to reduce emissions, “would likely
be far less cost-effective than a market-based approach because it would
discourage technological innovation and provide no financial incentive for
[sources] to reduce emissions below their required level.”115
Finally, cap-and-trade is linked to similar compliance programs in the
United States and neighboring nations.116 California’s program harmonizes
with similar cap-and-trade systems in Québec, Ontario, British Columbia,

111. Policy Basics: Policies to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, CNTR. ON BUDGET
& POL. PRIORITIES (Dec. 21, 2015) https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
PolicyBasic_CapTrade.pdf [hereinafter Policy Basics].
112. See supra text accompanying notes 22–25.
113. Policy Basics, supra note 111. See also Appendix A: CAP-AND-TRADE COSTEFFECTIVE REDUCTIONS TABLE, infra (sourced from 2017–18 CAP-AND-TRADE EXPENDITURE
PLAN, supra note 30, at 3).
114. See, e.g., Policy Basics, supra note 111, at 2 (comparing cap-and-trade, a carbon
tax, and command-and-control regulatory frameworks).
115. Id.
116. See Coghlan & Cullenward, supra note 9, at 232–33 (explaining the linked carbonmarket between California and Québec in the Western Climate Initiative); Erica Morehouse,
Western Climate Initiative Expands: Ontario to Join California-Québec Carbon Market,
ENVT’L DEF. FUND (Sept. 22, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/climatetalks/2017/09/22/westernclimate-initiative-expands-ontario-to-join-california-quebec-carbon-market/ [https://perma.cc/
48NY-24MP]. See, e.g., LINKAGE, CAL. AIR. RES. BD., https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
linkage/linkage.htm [https://perma.cc/KE6E-92T5].
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and Manitoba through the Western Climate Initiative (WCI).117 Although
WCI represents a voluntary agreement among its members, it is coordinated
with emissions trading programs of the participating jurisdictions, much
like CARB’s coordinated efforts between the agency and local air districts
and neighboring states.118 WCI Partner jurisdictions consult to provide
recommendations for achieving emissions reductions and comprehensive
trading systems in the most cost-effective, administratively feasible manner.119
Thus, California’s current cap-and-trade framework appears to be an optimal,
synchronized approach to achieve AB 32’s goals. Because cap-and-trade
is likely the most workable regulatory framework, this Article proposes a
solution to provide a “check” of sorts on CARB’s implementation and
enforcement authority under AB 32.
B. Cooperative Agency Alternatives
CARB is undoubtedly the lead agency on air quality issues and has been
since 1967.120 CARB is governed by an eleven-member board: six experts
in fields like medicine, engineering, chemistry, business, and law and five
elected officials from California’s regional air pollution control agencies.121
Because CARB is responsible for such far-reaching policy objectives in
monitoring statewide air quality, the Agency reasonably involves some
groups to assist it with specified air quality matters.
It is practicable for the Legislature or CARB to create a co-committee
to assist the agency’s implementation of AB 32, largely because a similar
body already exists. The Legislature created EJAC through AB 32 to ensure
117. CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: BACKGROUND INFORMATION, CAL. AIR. RES. BD., https://
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm [https://perma.cc/4QUF-W73W] (last
reviewed Nov. 21, 2017).
118. Id.
119. PARTICIPATION IN THE WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, CAL. AIR. RES. BD., https://
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/wci/agreement.htm [https://perma.cc/32DE-QMEB]. WCI
Partners formed WCI, Inc., in 2007 as a non-profit corporation to provide administrative
and coordination support for WCI Partners’ implementation of their respective cap-andtrade programs. See generally Western Climate Initiative, Inc., WCI, INC., http://www.wciinc.org/index.php [https://perma.cc/2Z7P-T65A].
120. See supra note 108 (citing cases referencing the propensity of California courts
to deem CARB the expert on air quality matters); CAL. AIR RES. BD., History of Air
Resources Board (2019), https://www.arb.ca.gov/knowzone/history.htm [https://perma.cc/
DRY5-Z2WT]. California passed the Mulford-Carrel Act in 1967 to establish CARB by
combining the Bureau of Air Sanitation and the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board.
Id.
121. Id.
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that CARB considered impacts of GHG emissions on DACs and low-income
communities.122 Although CARB must consider EJAC’s recommendations
in developing AB 32’s Scoping Plan, CARB is not required to incorporate
EJAC’s recommendations in its final plans to implement AB 32.123
Furthermore, EJAC’s responsibilities lie within the realm of environmental
justice and focus primarily on ameliorating disproportionate impacts of
GHG emissions on DACs.124 Notwithstanding the benefits that EJAC’s
recommendations provide, EJAC merely serves a supportive role with
non-compulsory influence on CARB’s implementation of AB 32. In other
words, EJAC has no teeth.
Still, EJAC is proof that CARB abides by statutory directives to consult
relevant agencies. This Article proposes that the Legislature create a new,
independent scientific advisory committee—or an enabling statute directing
CARB to create the committee—to partner with CARB to implement and
enforce AB 32 through 2020, and SB 32 through 2030. The independent
scientific advisory committee, or Scientific Compliance and Enforcement
Board (SCEB), would perform scientific analyses to verify GHG emissions
reductions from regulated sources and provide more scrutinized approaches
to ensure reductions from offsets are real. SCEB would be funded through
allowance auction revenues, and it would be dedicated specifically to
monitoring and verifying recorded emissions reductions. SCEB may also
verify that CARB awards offset credits for activities truly “additional” to
regulated entities’ emission reduction activities.125 Delegating the
aforementioned responsibilities to SCEB allows CARB to focus on policy,
as experts in policy, and properly charges scientists with providing data
to confirm with scientific evidence that reductions are real.
SCEB would be a ten- to fifteen-member board comprised of leading
scientists from California’s universities and research centers. Specifically,
CARB may source board members from institutions with qualifying research
facilities and technology to provide one or two scientists and researchers

122. See supra note 18.
123. SCOPING PLAN UPDATE, supra note 3. See also ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM.,
AB 32 ENVIRONMENTAL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (EJAC) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PROPOSED 2030 TARGET SCOPING PLAN UPDATE (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/
ejac_recommendations_proposed_plan122216.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHW3-EKCM] (providing
all 2016 recommendations by EJAC to CARB for continued implementation of AB 32).
124. DACs are often located in “hotspots” with highly concentrated pollution levels.
125. This is a key impediment to CARB’s current cap-and-trade scheme and may
only exacerbate if verification safeguards are not soon implemented. See e.g., Citizens
Against Refinery’s Effects, Inc. v. EPA, 643 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1981) (affirming EPA approval
of a permit to construct an oil refinery wherein EPA awarded ozone offset credits for conduct
that would have happened anyway).
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to join SCEB.126 It is most beneficial to include individuals from universities
around the state to arm SCEB with collective, regional analyses of statewide
air quality and GHG emissions. This idea embraces a pragmatic method
to achieve accurate emissions measurements by providing comprehensive
regional calculations of GHG emissions.
Although CARB would likely select SCEB members, California has many
notable research facilities for CARB to consider. For example, two SCEB
members might be professional researchers from the Air Quality Research
Center at the University of California, Davis (UC Davis), where researchers
have experience with performing scientific analyses on emissions, air quality
issues, and public health near the San Fernando and San Joaquin Valleys.127
Additionally, two SCEB members could be professional researchers from
the Center for Clean Air at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA),
where scientists and researchers produce studies on air quality, health, and
sustainability in the Los Angeles area.128 Remaining SCEB researchers and
scientists might hail from universities or facilities in remaining regions of
the state.129
Finally, SCEB would have the “teeth” EJAC lacks to compel CARB to
act, based on SCEB’s recommendations and findings. Legislation that creates
SCEB should provide SCEB with authority to impose sanctions on regulated
sources for noncompliance. Sanctions may increase as sources repeatedly
fail to attain reductions as specified in CARB’s cap. Such authority may
provide SCEB with teeth to ensure CARB and regulated sources acknowledge
and cooperate with empirical emissions data findings. Accordingly, CARB
may then enforce compliance with GHG emissions caps, rather than relying
on estimates and standards-based offset measurements for reductions.

126. The Legislature may permit CARB to define “qualifying research facilities and
technology,” or it may specify the facilities equipped with technology to make the necessary
climate assessments.
127. See AQRC Researchers Measure Historic Methane Gas Leak in Southern California
Near Porter Ranch – An Affluent subdivision of the San Fernando Valley Northwest of Downtown
Los Angeles, U.C. DAVIS AIR QUALITY RES. CTR. (Feb. 25, 2016), https://aqrc.ucdavis.edu/
outreach/news/#id966 [https://perma.cc/3T65-Z5GH].
128. See generally Center for Clean Air: Our Work, The Regents of the University of
California, UCLA, https://www.ioes.ucla.edu/cleanair/our-work/ [https://perma.cc/KFG3Y9BF].
129. See e.g., UNIV. OF CAL. SANTA BARBARA, SANTA BARBARA CTY. AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL DIST., https://www.ourair.org/ucsb/ [https://perma.cc/9N6M-M3GR].
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is necessary to ensure California’s climate change policies attain their
intended goals because these policies often serve as model strategies for the
rest for the world. Thus, to ensure that California reduces statewide GHG
emissions by 50 percent in 2030, the science of the reductions must be
accurate and verifiable. SCEB can assist CARB with enforcing statutory
emissions caps and ensuring that regulated sources are indeed abiding by
statutory caps to reduce their GHG emissions.
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APPENDIX A
EXHIBIT A: CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATION DESIGNED TO
ENCOURAGE COST-EFFECTIVE REDUCTIONS TABLE130
ure 2

Cap-and-Trade Designed to Limit Emissions at Lowest Cost

CD

Without Cap

With Cost to Aeduce Emission

Cosl lo Reduce: $25

0

State Issues

0

W ith Cap

3 Allowances

J.YJ19;ye1JJ08

:,-J J

Cos l lo A8duce· $20

~
~
Cosl lo Reduce: $1 5

~ Jl9lYeiJJ.<;;8

,:-J-J

Cos l lo Reduce· $ 10

Emissions: 4

Emissions: 3
Emission Reduced:
Cost of Reduction: S1O

130. THE 2017-18 BUDGET: CAP-AND-TRADE EXPENDITURE PLAN, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S
OFFICE at 8 (Feb. 2017), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/3553/cap-and-trade-021317.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88C3-5NM7].
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